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Gazelle firms are young high growth ventures. They have less than five years old, 
employ more than ten workers and their annualized growth is greater than twenty percent 
per year over a three-year period. Given their importance in the economy, previous studies 
have evaluated the main determinants for their short-term growth. This study takes a 
novel approach and evaluates gazelles’ long-term performance, in terms of job creation 
and survival.  More specifically, we analyze if gazelle firms continue to outperform the 
other start-ups in the long run or if their growth is temporary.   
To provide new insights, we used a matched employer-employee dataset (QP- 
“Quadros de Pessoal”).  Our data enable us to identify gazelle start-ups and their founders. 
We select all start-ups established between 2000 and 2005 and we track them for a seven-
year period. We identify 175 gazelle start-ups and 37,700 non-gazelle start-ups. 
Our results suggest that gazelle firms perform better on the long run. In 
comparison with the non-gazelle start-ups, their size increased by 144, 130, 86, 69, 52, 
37 and 19 percent in years 4 to 10, respectively. However, we have not found statistical 
evidence of gazelle firms being more likely to survive on the long run, thus we cannot 
conclude that gazelle firms are less likely to survive on the long run. 
 
JEL Classification: M10, M13, L25, L20. 





As empresas gazela são empresas jovens de alto crescimento. Estas têm menos de 
cinco anos de idade, empregam mais de dez trabalhadores e o seu crescimento anualizado 
é maior do que vinte por cento por ano, durante um período de três anos. Dada a 
importância destas empresas na economia, alguns estudos anteriores avaliaram os 
principais determinantes para crescimento destas empresas a curto prazo. Este estudo tem 
uma abordagem nova e avalia o desempenho a longo prazo das gazelas, em termos de 
criação de emprego e sobrevivência. Mais especificamente, analisamos se as empresas 
gazela continuam a superar as outras start-ups em fase de arranque, a longo prazo ou se o 
seu crescimento é temporário. 
Para proporcionar uma nova visão, foi utilizado uma base de dados empregador-
empregado (QP- "Quadros de Pessoal"). Os nossos dados permitem identificar as 
empresas gazela e seus fundadores. Nós selecionamos todas as start-ups estabelecidas 
entre 2000 e 2005 e seguimo-las por um período de sete anos. Identificamos 175 empresas 
gazela e 37.700 empresas não-gazela.  
Os nossos resultados sugerem que as empresas gazelas têm um melhor 
desempenho a longo prazo. O tamanho das empresas gazela aumentou em 144, 130, 86, 
69, 52, 37 e 19 porcento entre os anos 4 e 10, respetivamente, em comparação com as 
empresas não-gazela. No entanto, não há evidência estatística que permita concluir que 
as empresas gazela têm uma maior taxa de sobrevivência no longo prazo. 
 
Classificação JEL: M10, M13, L25, L20. 
Palavras-chave: empresas de alto crescimento, gazelas, desempenho de longo 
prazo, sobrevivência da empresa. 
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1 | Introduction 
A small number of young high growth firms has received considerable attention 
in the existing literature. They are known as gazelle firms and they are seen as the 
“heroes” from the macroeconomic point of view as their presence is associated with 
innovation, growth and job creation. Policy makers also increasingly recognise the special 
role of these fast growing firms. 
The literature generally refers to high-growth firms1 as firms with relative high 
grow rates regardless of age and size, whereas gazelle firms are high grow young firms 
(Henrekson and Johansson, 2010). Although there is still some controversy regarding the 
growth and age definitions, existing literature defines gazelles2, as “a business 
establishment which has achieved a minimum of twenty percent of sales growth each year 
over the interval (for five years), starting from a base year revenue of at least $100,000” 
(Birch et al. 1995, p.46). Gazelles differ from the “mice”- small firms with less than 
twenty employees, and “elephants” - large firms with more than five hundred employees. 
More recently, OECD (2007) defines gazelle firms as firms with less than five years old, 
with an average annualized growth rate greater than twenty percent per year over a three-
year period, and with ten or more employees at the beginning of the period.3 In this study, 
we use OECD definition.  
Despite the heterogeneity across the studies, the majority of the studies find that 
gazelle firms are younger on average (Henrenkson and Johansson, 2010).  They have 
                                                 
1 OECD defines high growth enterprises as firms with average yearly growth rate of twenty percent or more 
over a three-year period, with ten or more employees in the first year. Growth is measured by the number of employees 
and by turnover. 
2 Also known as Birch firms. There are also known as gorilla’s firms which are the extremely fast gazelles 
e.g. Apple, Microsoft, Intel etc. (Brinkley, 2008).   
3 INE (2014) uses a similar definition of young high growth firms. Gazelles are defined as firms, with at least 
ten employees, that achieve an average annual growth rate of twenty over three years, measured in terms of number of 
employees or turnover. 
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different sizes, although small firms are overrepresented, and are present in all industries 
(Parker et al., 2010).  
While the positive short-term effects on economic growth are undeniable, the 
long-term economic gains from gazelle firms are less obvious (Stangler 2010). Previous 
research has evaluated the main determinants of their short-term growth but fewer have 
evaluated their long-term determinants. This study contributes to latter topic by answering 
the following research questions: What happens to gazelle firms after their first three 
years? Do they continue to grow or do they fail?  
To answer these questions, we use a matched employer–employee dataset (QP– 
“Quadros de Pessoal”). Our data enable us to identify gazelle start-ups and their founders 
and track them for a long period of time. Our data also include detailed information on 
the characteristics of the founders and start-ups initial conditions. 
Our results suggest that gazelle firms perform better on the long run. In 
comparison with the non-gazelles’ start-ups, they create 144, 130, 86 and 69 percent, 
more jobs in year 4, 5, 6 and 7, respectively. However, we have not found statistical 
evidence of gazelle firms being more likely to survive after the first seven years. 
Gazelle firms play a key role in the economy by reducing unemployment and 
creating jobs. Understanding the grow trajectories of these firms will allow policy makers 
to design better policy frameworks. Previous studies show that policy makers should 
focus on stimulating entrepreneurship in general, helping firms to survive, and allowing 
firms with potential to become high-growth firms (Mazerov and Leachman, 2016).  
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an 
overview of the relevant literature regarding the gazelle’s characteristics and their long 
run performance.  We also review the role of these companies in the economy and their 
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temporary growth. In section 3, we provide a description of our dataset and descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 discusses our methodological approach, and section 5 presents our 
results. Finally, section 6 concludes.  
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2 | Literature Background and Hypothesis 
Over the recent years, gazelle firms have been the main topic of several studies. 
On the one hand, the literature has highlighted the contributions of gazelles, as firms 
which provide high returns to shareholders (Acs et al. 2008) and create more jobs than 
other start-ups (Henrekson and Johansson, 2008). On the other hand, previous research 
evaluates gazelle’s main characteristics and the main drivers for their short-term growth. 
In this section, we summarize the relevant literature on their economic effects, 
characteristics and performance.   
2.1 | Economic Contribution of Gazelles 
Gazelle firms contribute more significantly to economic growth than other firms 
especially in periods of recession (Senderovitz et al., 2012).  As such, Bos and Stam 
(2011) argued that gazelle firms are early movers on recognizing and realizing industry 
opportunities. These firms are important vehicles for employment (Bos and Stam, 2011) 
as they account for a disproportionate share of jobs created, productivity and sales 
(Henrenkson and Johansson, 2010).  
Their economic and social impacts include productivity increases by reallocating 
resources from displaced firms to the stronger firms; spillover effects of rapid growth on 
other firms; and improvements on innovative activity. High-growth firms are also 
responsible for a disproportionate amount of innovation (Mason et al., 2009). Mason et 
al., (2009) suggest that young high-growth firms invest in resources and capabilities 
related to innovation. For example, firms that developed innovative products have a 4.4 
percent average growth rate in employment while non-innovative firms show an average 
growth rate of 2 percent. (Mason et al., 2009).  
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2.2 | Who are gazelle firms? 
 Previous studies have evaluated gazelle firms’ characteristics in terms of size, 
age, industry, region and innovative activity.  
Gazelle firms are young firms on average with less than five years of age 
(Daunfeldt et al. 2010; Anyadike-Danes et al. 2009). Acs and Mueller (2007) stated that 
the age is the real issue in business dynamics as most new firms are small, Daunfeldt et 
al. (2010) also suggested that firm age, rather than firm size, is the main determinant of 
the rapid growth. Furthermore, Haltiwanger et al. (2013) suggested that young firms 
create more jobs than small firms. However, Parker et al., (2010) and Moreno and Casillas 
(2000) argued that age is not a factor that distinguishes these companies from the rest. 
The most important is their innovative activity (Coad, 2009). 
Some studies argued that gazelle firms are concentrated on specific industries. 
However, industry is not a relevant key determinant of growth (Bos and Stam, 2011). 
Gazelle firms usually are not high-tech firms. In contrast, they operate in the private 
services sector (Henrekson and Johanson, 2010; Acs and Mueller, 2006), and are present 
across all industries (Bos and Stam, 2011; Nightingale and Coad, 2013; Senderovitz et al, 
2012).  
In terms of size, the majority of studies found that smaller companies grow faster, 
which means that size is inversely related to firm growth (Bigsten and Gebreeyesus, 
2007). However, other find that gazelle firms tend to be of all sizes (Henrekson and 
Johansson, 2010). In absolute terms, larger firms are important job contributors 
(Henrekson and Johansson 2010 and Mason et al., 2009), however small businesses 
achieve higher growth as they can duplicate their dimension in a short period of time 
(Daunfeldt et al. ,2010 and Moreno and Casillas, 2000). 
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Others studies argued that gazelle growth depends on the innovation activity of 
the start-up (Holzl and Friesenbichler, 2007; Audretsch, 2012 and Mason et al., 2009). 
Gazelle firms combine new inputs, develop new products which enable them to perform 
better than most firms and create new markets by destroying an existing one (Holzl and 
Friesenbichler, 2007). In fact, gazelle firms are innovative in the Schumpeterian sense. 
They require a competitive advantage in order to achieve an above average growth rate, 
which is achieved through new products, technical change or new processes (Holzl and 
Friesenbichler, 2007). Moreover, their success is rooted in product diversification and 
internationalization.  Most of their sales come from international markets, as such gazelle 
firms experience stronger export growth than other firms (Holzl and Friesenbichler, 
2007). According to Kuratko (2016), these firms are leaders in innovation, they produce 
twice as many products per employee as larger firms do and they are responsible for 55% 
of the innovations in different industries.  
In terms of location, gazelle firms do not seem to be concentrated in particular 
regions or near areas with higher levels of technology, instead they locate closer to the 
city center in large cities. (Audretsch, 2012 and Senderovitz et al., 2012). Gazelle regions 
are “regions that have a predominance of rapidly growing companies” (Acs and Mueller 
2006, p.94). These regions usually include universities and research facilities and have 
high share of employment available. 




2.3 | Gazelles and their long term performance  
According to the previous literature, gazelle firms do not survive in the long run. 
(Gjerlov-Juel and Guenther, 2012). Within five years, more than half fail and others leave 
the market few years later (Mazerov and Leachman, 2016). The literature shows that 
survival does not depend on the previous growth performance. In fact, some argued that 
there is a limit to growth, and after this limit is achieved it becomes inefficient to grow 
even further (Penrose, 1995). As such, high growth rates are not persistent overtime 
(Coad, 2009). 
Promoting young high growth firms does not guarantee the creation of sustainable 
jobs and firms in long run (Stangler, 2010). New firms create new jobs, but they also 
destroy employment in other firms (Stangler 2010). As such, some studies argue that on 
the long run, gazelle firms destroy not only the jobs that they created (as they fail) but 
also the jobs in other firms (Haltiwanger et al., 2013). Stangler (2010) showed that in the 
first two years, a third of gazelle start-ups in the US failed and, in five years, just 48 
percent survived. However, the growth of the surviving firms was more than enough to 
offset the firms that have failed. 
Gazelle firms are known as a “temporary phenomenon”4 in the life of a firm, 
especially if they are small firms (Holzl, 2008 and Buss, 2002). This means that a 
successful gazelle will develop from a small /medium size firm into a large one and 
stabilize, in the long run (Holzl and Friesenbichler, 2007). 
Growth rates are usually interpreted as a sign of competitive advantage and 
efficient production. However, there are usually two sides behind high growth rates. On 
the one hand, gazelle firms can take the advantage of economies of scale and skills 
                                                 
4 Temporary phenomenon is based on the three dimensions of a firm: size, age and growth. 
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brought in by employees (Gjerlov-Juel and Guenther, 2012). On the other hand, growing 
too fast might have a negative effect on firm’s long term performance which makes it 
difficult to establish solid and efficient organizational routines, therefore it will be more 
difficult to maintain high growth rates over time (Amat and Perramon 2010). These 
difficulties are caused by the so called “success traps” argued by Ahuja and Lampert 
(2001). And this happens when a firm focus only in a certain strategy which has been 
successful.  
In the same reasoning, some studies link the accumulation of experience with 
productivity growth (Eriksen, 2010).  This leads us to the organizational learning theory 
from March (1991) which implies a negative relation between employee turnover and 
firm performance. In other words, employer turnover leads to a loss of accumulated 
experience in the firms and consequently a weaker productivity. According to Eriksen 
(2010, p.5) the employee turnover leads to a loss of accumulated experience given that 
the firm loses the services of the individuals that are “bearers of its experience, and 
moreover, it takes time, effort and money for new hires to acquire the same level of 
knowledge as departing employees”.  
According to March (1991) the main goal of a firm is to achieve a sustainable 
competitive advantage. The trade-of between the strategies of exploitation and 
exploration are complementary and both essential to the success of the firm. Exploitation 
includes activities related with selection, implementation, execution and efficiency while 
exploration involves research, flexibility, experimentation, discovery, innovation risks 
and uncertainty.  March (1991) argued that firms which are focused on exploration require 
higher initial costs without getting benefits on short term. The phase of exploitation is 
generally characterized by a strong emphasis in economic growth through the usage of 
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the existing knowledge and learning processes. Moreover, the focus in the reduction of 
costs might generate economies of scale, which will decrease the average cost of each 
unit produced. For these reasons, March (1991) highlighted the importance of achieving 
the balance between exploration and exploitation within an organization in order to 
survive. The author also added that organizations learn from individuals and vice-versa. 
When a knowledgeable employee leaves, the organization loses firm-specific human 
capital. In addition, because of being constantly hiring new employees the ability to retain 
past learning reduces.  
Using the same reasoning, Penrose (2009) suggest that high initial growth leads 
to an inefficient integration of new employees, and therefore perform inefficiencies, 
stagnation and loss of competitive advantage.  Therefore, employee turnover has a 
negative effect on employee outflow, which leads to human capital losses, increases in 
turnover costs (i.e. recruiting expenses, training, learning contextual skills and 
development costs) and productivity declines (Eriksen, 2012, Glebbeek and Bax, 2002 
and March. 1991).  Despite the strong focus on the turnover costs, there are also benefits. 
Employee’s turnover may solve bad performance, increases firms’ skills, refresh their 
initial knowledge, especially for innovative purposes (Gjerlov-Juel and Guenther, 2012). 
Gazelle firms experience employee outflow and human capital decreases 
(Gjerlov-Juel and Guenther, 2012). But the high initial inflow of new employees is the 
biggest challenge for these firms because they affect organization stability (organizational 
form, routines and norms) and efficiency leading to a negative performance on the long 
run.  Several factors inhibit growth on the long run, for instance, issues related to the firm, 
the micro and macroeconomic environment and the technology.  Among those factors, 
Holzl and Friesenbichler (2007) pointed out resistant to change, ownership structure 
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(family business have less ambition to grow); age (younger founders have the ambition 
to grow) and the economic reasoning related with the adjustment costs and lack of capital. 
Audretsch (2012) adds to the list the characteristics of founding teams (the stability of the 
team members, the heterogeneity of their background); international market orientation; 
access to resources.  Forsberg and Mattsson (2006) pointed that large fixed cost, 
unsuccessful investments in the market, rapid economic turnover/sales, inefficient cash 
flow and cash reserves as other factors that affect high growth. The most important 
external factors are economic recession, loss of important clients and the difficult to get 
loans. 
To sum up, previous literature suggested that the majority of gazelle firms will 
either fail or reduce their growth rate thus we hypothesize: 
 







3 | Data and Descriptive Statistics  
3.1 | Data 
Our analysis draws on a matched employer-employee database (QP - “Quadros 
de Pessoal”).  The matched employer-employee database is a mandatory survey that 
gathers comprehensive information on an average of 220,000 firms and two million 
individuals per year, which covers all Portuguese private sector for a longer period from 
1986 to 2012. It is submitted annually to the Portuguese Ministry of Employment and 
Social Security by start-ups with at least one employee. Individuals and firms are cross 
referenced by a unique identifier. Also, the database makes it possible to link founders 
with their start-ups and evaluate them for a long time span. It has comprehensive 
information at the individual and firm level. Every year, firms report year of creation, 
size, and industry, number of establishments, initial capital, and ownership structure. At 
the founder level, the database contains information on gender, age, date of hire, 
education, occupation, working hours, and earnings per hour. 
3.2 | Sample  
From the QP, we start by selecting all start-ups established between 2000 and 
2005 and track them for the next seven years. Therefore, we will have six cohorts, 
respectively: 2000-2007; 2001-2008; 2002-2009; 2003-2010; 2004-2011 and 2005-2012. 
Next, we identify the gazelle firms and non-gazelle firms. For that purpose, we use OECD 
(2007) definition. Gazelle firms are firms established initially by ten or more employees, 
with twenty percent average growth rate in the first three years. We exclude from our 
sample start-ups established in the agriculture and fishing sector and located in Madeira 




 Then, for those start-ups, we identify their founders and their background history. 
We restrict our sample to founders aged between 20 and 65 years old and we exclude 
start-ups which we could not identify the owner and their background history. We only 
consider organically growing firms and thus exclude all firms that experienced mergers 
and/ or acquisitions as Holzl and Friesenbichler, (2007). Our sample includes 175 gazelle 
firms and 37,700 non-gazelle firms totalling 37,875 start-ups and 67,926 entrepreneurs.  
  
3.3 | Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2 presents the description of our variables and Table 3 summarizes the 
descriptive statistics of our sample. Start-ups in our sample are small, employing initially 
on average 3.8 workers.  
As expected gazelle firms are larger initially employing 2849 employees while in 
the following years, we see that number of employees increases for gazelle firms but 
decreases for non-gazelle firms (Table A. 1 and Table A. 2). Gazelle firms and non-
gazelle firms survive on average 7.6 and 6.2 years, respectively.  Most of the start-ups are 
established in the “Services" sector (54 percent), and the remaining are dispersed by 
"Construction" (26 percent), "Manufacturing" (11 percent) and "Other services" (9 
percent) sectors.  Services includes the ISIC codes 50-74, Manufacturing includes the 
ISIC 15-37 and Other services includes 41, 80, 85 and 90-93 ISIC codes corresponding 
to activities such as: education, health and electricity. Gazelle firms are most notably in 
“Construction” (56 percent) and “Services” (27 percent) sectors, while non-gazelle firms 
are overrepresented in “Services” (55 percent) sector. These start-ups are mostly located 
in three regions: "Norte", “Centro” and “Lisboa” with (38 percent), (27 percent) and (22 
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percent) respectively.   More than half of the gazelle firms are located in the “Norte” and 
“Lisboa” (23 percent) regions.  Non-gazelle firms are more dispersed in terms of 
locations, (Figure 1 and Figure 2). 
In our sample, founders are predominantly men (70 percent) aged approximately 
37 years old. They are less likely to be foreign (4 percent).  In terms of education, 22 
percent of the entrepreneurs have very low education, 40 percent have low education, 22 
percent have medium education and the remaining 16 percent are high educated. The 
percentage of founders with high and medium education is higher in non-gazelle firms 
than in gazelle firms (22 and 16 percent versus 16 and 14 percent, respectively). More 
than 42 percent of all start-ups in our sample are established by one founder.  In terms of 
experience, we conclude that 18 percent of the founders previously worked on the same 
industry and 27 percent worked before in the same region. In gazelle firms, the percentage 
of founders with industry and region experience is higher when compared with non-
gazelle firms (37 and 34 percent versus 27 and 18 percent, respectively). 
 
Figure 3, shows the average number of employees for gazelle and non-gazelle 
firms. Table A. 1 and Table A. 2 shows the same but in terms of regions. We can conclude 
that the region “Lisboa” is most notably since employs the highest number of employees 
in the first three years and also at year ten. “Norte” and “Centro” are also the regions that 
have created more jobs, after “Lisboa”, but they also decreased the number of employees 
in the period observed, however the region “Centro” was the one which decreased less, 
ending up with 284 employees (Norte ended up with 736 employees). This decrease 
happens after the three first years observed. Moreover “Lisboa” was the only region 
which has increased exponentially the number of employees ending up with 10345, while 
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“Algarve” ended with none employees. This increase more than offset the decrease in the 
rest regions when compared with moment zero and moment ten, we can double check in 
figure 3 the exponential pattern.   
On contrarily, non-gazelle firms increased the number of employees until year 
one however, it is most notable the biggest decrease in all regions particularly after year 
seven. The regions “Norte”, “Centro” and “Lisboa” were most notably while “Alentejo” 
and “Algarve” were the regions that did not create many jobs in the scale observed.  
Finally, in Figure 4 we can find the proportion of gazelle and non-gazelles firms 
which survived in terms of region. A considerable number of gazelle firms are still 
running after the first seven years of activity. This is notable in activities related with 
“Services” and “Construction “, they are mostly located in “Norte”, “Lisboa” and 
“Centro”. We can also have the same conclusion regarding non-gazelle firms. In the 
period observed, 111 gazelle firms from a total of 175 and 19,741 non-gazelle firms 





4 | Empirical Methodology and Results 
Our empirical strategy evaluates how gazelle firms perform compared with other 
start-ups. We assess the performance by looking at size after the first three years and 
survival in the long run.  
4.1 | Size 
To evaluate if gazelle growth is temporary, we estimate the following equation: 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑦 =  𝛼𝑟 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝜃𝑟 + β1 𝐺𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑗   + β2 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑓 +  𝑋′𝑖 δ1 + δ2founderi + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑦 [1] 
where i denotes the founder, j is the start-up firm, y denotes the entry year, r is the start-
up location (NUTS II region) 5 and k the industry (ISIC code at two-digit level)6. 
The dependent variable, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑦 is the logarithm of the number of employees of 
a start-up in year t (t=4, ... ,10).  For example, Size4 is the logarithm of the number of 
employees of a start-up in 4th year of activity.   
Our variable of interest is 𝐺𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑗 , a dummy variable equalling one if it is a 
gazelle firm and zero otherwise. Our hypothesis suggest that beta should be negative and 
statistically significant. We include 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑓 which is the logarithm of the initial 
number of employees of the start-ups. 
 𝑋′𝑖 is a vector of founder characteristics: founder’s age and founder’s age squared 
in the entry year of the start-up; gender, equals 1 for men and 0 for women; education is 
measured by four categorical variables: High education, which is a dummy variable 
equalling one for founders with bachelors, masters or doctoral degrees; Medium 
                                                 
5 The Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics (NUTS) is a regional classification developed and 
regulated by the European Union. Following NUTS II division, Portugal is divided in seven regions: Norte, Centro, 
Lisboa, Alentejo, Algarve, Açores and Madeira. 
6 The International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC), Rev.3.1 is an 
industry classification developed by United Nations which is the same as the Portuguese Classification of Economic 
Activities (CAE) Rev. 2.1. There are 39 ISIC 2-digit categories in the data, covering essentially Agriculture, Fishing 
and Mining (ISIC 1-14), Manufacturing (ISIC 15-37), Construction (ISIC 45) and Services (ISIC 50-74). 
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education, is a dummy variable equalling one for individuals reporting a high school 
diploma or vocational school degree; Low education, is a dummy variable equalling one 
for individuals that attended junior high school; and Very Low education, is a dummy 
variable equalling one for individuals who never attended or completed the elementary 
school; foreign, which equals 1 for foreign and 0 for Portuguese nationality; industry 
experience, equalling 1 for founders that previously worked in the same industry (on the 
same 4-digit industry code) and 0 otherwise; and regional experience corresponds to 1 if 
the founders have previously worked in the same municipality; and 0 otherwise. 
We include a dummy variable for sole entrepreneur, meaning that the variable 
equals one for ventures established by one founders and zero otherwise. We include entry 
fixed effects, 𝑦𝑦 to control for the macroeconomic context, 𝜃𝑟 accounts for industry fixed 
effects, 𝛼𝑟 and for region fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the start-up level. 
The omitted category are very low educated female founders. 
Table 4 presents the coefficient estimators for the effects of gazelle on size after 
the first four years using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  Columns (1) to (7) show the 
yearly number of employees from the fourth year until year ten, respectively. For the 
period considered, gazelle firms’ grow more than non-gazelle firms did. Nevertheless, 
after the seventh year, this effect is weaker and is less significant.  The size of the gazelle 
firms increased 144 percent in the first four years however, in the last year observed they 
only increased 19 percent comparing to non-gazelle firms.  Therefore, there is evidence 
that our first hypothesis that suggested gazelle firms perform worse in the long run in 
terms of job creation is not supported. 
As expected, we find that demographic and education characteristics of the 
founders affect the size of the start-up after the first three years. The same conclusion was 
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reached by Audretsch (2012) and Henrenkson and Johansson, (2010). For all the years, 
there is an inverted U shape relationship between founders age and size.  If the founder is 
male, the size of the firms increases by 5 percent on the fourth year and 2 percent on the 
tenth year. The coefficients – high education, industry and region experience are 
positively related with the firms’ size while the number of founders, the nationality are 
inversely related with the size of the firm. Founders with high education, industry and 
region experience are more likely to establish larger firms. Compared to very low 
educated founders, high educator founders, increase the size of the firm by 3.3 percent on 
year ten.  
As expected, the initial number of employees affect the size of the start-up after 
the first three years. The initial number of employees increases the size of start-ups by 
0.6 percent and 0.2 in year four and ten, respectively. We conclude that the initial number 
of employees affects the firms’ size in the long run.  
In addition, Table 5 and Table 6 show the number of employees in year four and 
ten, respectively. We can infer that the variables: initial size, gender and age are positively 
related with the firms’ size in a region perspective in year four.  
Gazelle firms grow more than non-gazelle firms in “Lisboa” and the statistical 
significance decrease when comparing year four and year ten. 
In year ten, the regions “Alentejo” and “Algarve” have a negative effect, meaning 
that gazelle firms grow less than non-gazelle firms. This can be explained by the lack of 
population and the seasonality effect.  The coefficient initial size is positively and 
statistically significant related with firms’ size, while founder is negatively and 
statistically significant for all regions in both years.  
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Comparing both years, we can find that the coefficients high education and gender 
are positively and statistically significant in year four for “Norte”, “Centro” and “Lisboa” 
regions, while in year ten the coefficient High education is only statistically significant in 
“Norte”.  
To sum up, we can conclude that the initial number of employees affects 
positively the size of gazelle firms, in a region perspective and “Lisboa” is the region 
where this effect is higher.  
4.2 | Survival  
To analyse survival, we start by estimating a logit model using the following 
equation: 
𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑦 =  𝛼𝑟 + 𝑦𝑦 + 𝜃𝑟 +  𝛽1 𝐺𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑗 + 𝑋′𝑖 𝛿1 + 𝛿2𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑓 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑦 [2] 
where i denotes the founder, j is the start-up firm, y denotes the entry year, r is the start-
up location (NUTS II region) and k the industry (ISIC code at two-digit level). Again, we 
control for entry, industry and region fixed effects. 
The dependent variable, 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑦, is a dummy variable equalling one if the 
start-up is still running after seven years and zero otherwise. Our hypothesis suggest that 
beta should be lower than zero suggesting that the probability of a gazelle firm to survive 
is lower, ceteris paribus. 
𝑋′𝑖 is a vector of founder’s characteristics, which includes age, education, 
nationality industry experience and regional experience, as previously mentioned in 
section 4.1. We include 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑓  which is the logarithm of the initial number of 
employees of the start-ups. 
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Table 7 shows the marginal effects for start-ups survival using the Logit Model. 
We present on Column (1), the results using a sample with all firms; in Column (2) and 
(3) we present the results for gazelle firms and non-gazelle firms respectively.   
It seems to be the case that gazelle firms are more likely to survive after seven 
years of activity, i.e. gazelle firms increase the probability of survival by 2.1 percent. 
However, there are evidence that the coefficient that measures this is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, we have not found statistically evidence of gazelle firms being 
more likely to survive on the long run, thus we cannot conclude that gazelle firms are less 
likely to survive on the long run. 
We can conclude that the relation between “age” and survival is a quadratic 
function, meaning that there is always a positive value for “age” when the effect of “age” 
on “survival” is zero; before this point7, “age” has a positive effect on “survival” and after 
this point, “age” has a negative effect. In our case, for all firms, the coefficients for “age” 
and “age2” are positive and negative, respectively, meaning that we have a parabolic 
shape and until the maximum point founder’s age is beneficial for firms’ survival and 
after that point founder’s age becomes negatively relative with firms’ survival. However, 
with gazelle firms we have a U-shape function since the coefficients are negative and 
positive, respectively, and this captures an increasing effect of “age” on survival. 
 Gender, region experience, industry experience affects positively firms’ survival 
and they are statistically significant. They increase the probability of survival by 2.1, 1.9 
and 3.9 percent for all firms, respectively. The same happens with education, but only for 
high educated founders (2.3 percent), while low and medium educated founders have a 
                                                 




negative relationship firms’ survival.  Foreign founders are also negatively related with 
survival. 
Initial size increases the probability of start-ups survival by 7.6 percent. However, 
the determinants of survival are different for gazelle and non-gazelle firms. For example, 
the initial size is only positively and statistically significant for non-gazelle firms. The 
initial size affects negatively the survival of gazelle firms.  This means that a high initial 
size is more beneficial for non-gazelle firms. For gazelle firms, the coefficient “gender” 
is negatively related while positively related for non-gazelle firms. Moreover, the 
coefficients - industry experience and region experience have a positive sign, however 
they are only statistically significant for non- gazelle firms when compared with gazelle 
firms. 
Table 7, in column (4), presents an additional regression, which introduces the 
interaction variable initial size*gazelle to our initial equation.  The interaction variable 
added is negatively related and is not statistically significant. The effect of the initial 
number of employees in firms’ survival is negative by 0.05 for gazelle firms and 0.08 for 
non-gazelle firms. 
 Adding this interaction, we conclude that the initial number of employees in 
gazelle firms is positively related with firms’ survival. More, we found statistical 
evidence that gazelle firms increase the probability of survival by 38 percent. The 
conclusions for the remain coefficients doesn’t change our results. Thus, the results do 
not support our hypothesis which suggest that gazelle firms are more likely to fail on the 
long run than non-gazelle firms.  
Gazelle Entrepreneurs 
21 
Furthermore, we analyse the firms’ survival by regions, Table 8. We cannot 
conclude that gazelle firms are more likely to survive in “Algarve”, “Lisboa” and in 
“Norte” regions because we have not found statistically evidence. 
The initial number of employees are positively and statistically significant in a 
region perspective. The coefficient increases the probability of start-ups survival by 11.3 
percent in “Algarve”, 3.1 percent in “Lisboa” and 8.1 percent in “Norte”. For all the 
regions, there is an inverted U shape relationship between founder’s age and size. The 
variables –gender, industry and region experience are positively related with firms’ 
survival in all regions, while medium education and foreign are negatively related.  
As a robustness check, we perform a Linear Probability Model (LPM) and a Probit 
Model. Both models suggest similar results regarding firm’s survival.  Table A. 3, Table 
A. 4 and Table A. 5 in the appendix present the results for the two estimations. 
 
We also use a duration model to estimate start-ups survival. The Cox proportional 
model is the most used multivariate approach for analysing survival data because the 
estimated hazards are always positive, it requires fewer assumptions and the model is 
robust. The model is built from two parts: the baseline hazard function [describes how 
the hazard changes over time at the baseline (the baseline is where all explanatory 
variables are zero)] and the effect of parameters (is how the hazard changes in response 
to explanatory variables). “The hazard function is the instantaneous probability of leaving 
a state of conditional on survival to time t “(Cameron and Trived 2005, p.576). 
 
Mathematically, the Cox model is written as:  
ℎ (𝑡|𝑥𝑗
′) =  ℎ0(𝑡)exp (𝑥𝑗
′𝛽)          [3] 
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where ℎ0(𝑡) is the hazard function, 𝑥𝑗
′ is the vector of explanatory variables and 
𝛽 is the vector of coefficients to be estimated. 
Table 9 presents the results of the Cox Proportional Hazard model for start-ups 
survival.  If the coefficient is negative, the hazard function increases the probability of 
the firm survive at moment t.  A low hazard rate is indicative of a firm that is more 
competitive and more likely to survive. 
For a positive 𝛽, the hazard function decline the probability of the firm survive at 
moment t.  
Once again, it seems to be the case that gazelle firms are more likely to survive 
when comparing to non-gazelle firms. Although, the coefficient is negative and not 
significant at 11.7 percent (-0.117). Therefore, we have not found statistically evidence 
of gazelle firms being more likely to survive. 
In terms of gender, male entrepreneurs have higher survival prospects. Founders 
with region experience seems to have higher chance to survive, however with no 
statistical evidence. Education affects the survival prospects given by the negative 
coefficient. Start-ups with larger size have higher survival prospects.  
For gazelle firms, we can conclude that foreign is the only statistically significant 
variable, however they have fewer chances of survival, however with no statistical 
evidence. Gazelle entrepreneurs with region experience seems to have higher chance to 
survive. While entrepreneurs with any level of education and previous industry 
experience have less survival prospects also with no statistical evidence. The start-ups 
initial size decreases the chance of failure, however the chance of survival is higher and 
only statistically significant in non-gazelle firms. 
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 Founders who have previously worked in the same region affect more the 
survival of start-ups and the chance to survival is higher when compared with gazelle 
firms. While founders with industry experience have more chance to survive in non-
gazelle firms.  Start-ups established by one founder increase the chance of survival in all 
firms, and decrease the survival prospects in terms of gazelle firms. Most of the 
coefficients, increase the chance to survive in non-gazelle firms. 
We have also introduced in the initial equation, the interaction size*gazelle.  The 
coefficient added although presents a negative sign and it is not statistically significant 
which we cannot argue that the effect of the initial number of employees in gazelle firms 
have higher survival prospects (Table 9).  
Adding the interaction variable, we conclude that gazelle firms seems to be less 
likely, (by 82 percent) to survive when compared to non-gazelle firms, however we have 
not found statically evidence to conclude that gazelle firms are less likely to survive in 
the long run. The conclusions for the remain coefficients does not change our results. 
In Table 10, we used the duration model to estimate start-ups survival in terms of 
location. Moreover, it seems that gazelle firms are more likely to survive when comparing 
to non-gazelle showed by the negative sign. However, we have not found statistically 
evidence of gazelle firms being more likely to survive in all regions. 
We conclude that start-ups with larger size have higher survival prospects in all 
regions. The regions “Alentejo” and “Norte” have higher survival prospects than the 
remain regions. In terms of gender, male entrepreneurs have higher chances to survive in 
all regions except in “Alentejo”. Start-ups established by one founder increases the chance 
of survival in all regions.   
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In terms of region, we also cannot suggest that gazelle firms are more likely to 
survive than non-gazelle firms what supports our previous estimation.   
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 Conclusion  
Gazelle firms and their extraordinary growth is a regular topic in the 
entrepreneurship literature. In this study, we add to the literature by evaluating gazelle 
firms’ long-term performance, in terms of size after the first three years and survival 
prospects.  
Using a sample of 175 gazelle firms and 37,700 non-gazelle firms, we find that 
the size of gazelle firms increased in comparison to non-gazelle firms and this is more 
concentrated in “Lisboa”. The grow of gazelle firms was more than enough to offset the 
decrease found in the main regions. In other words, gazelle firms performed better than 
non-gazelle firms, however their growth decreased over the years observed. Thus, our 
hypothesis which suggested, that gazelle firms perform worse in the long run in terms of 
job creation, is not supported by the applied model.  
In terms of survival, the Logit model suggest that there is no difference in the 
survival prospects of gazelle and non-gazelle firms. However, when we add the 
interaction variable we find that gazelle firms are more likely to survive comparing to 
non-gazelle firms. A relevant aspect we can highlight is the negative impact of the initial 
number of employees on gazelle firms’ survival, that may be caused by the hurry to 
expand, which can lead to errors in hiring decisions and can be harmful in the company 
environment.  
The Cox Hazard Model reinforces the results initially obtained by the Logit 
model, i.e., we have not found statistical evidence that gazelle firms are less likely to 
survive when compared to non-gazelle firms by the applied model. As well as the Logit 
model, our results show that firms with larger size have higher survival prospects and this 
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can be explained by the advantage of economies of scale, the increase of refreshed skills 
and innovation processes.  
Gazelle firms exist across all industries, however they are more notable in 
activities related with construction and services and they are mostly located in the urban 
centers (“Lisboa” and “Norte”). We reached to the same conclusions as Henrekson and 
Johansson (2010). They argued that gazelle firms are not high-technological firms and 
appear to be overrepresented in services. Contrarily, non-gazelle firms are more dispersed 
in terms of region and sectors.  
This study presents some limitations. First, our sample of gazelle firms is very 
small, so future studies should extend the period of analysis to track a larger sample. 
Second, the time range of the data is small. We only evaluate start-ups established 
between 2000 and 2005 thus it would be interesting for further studies to evaluate how 
gazelle firms performed before and after the European crisis. Third, other measures of 
size should be considered. In our investigation we measured the size of gazelles firms as 
the number of employees so a further development should be considering also sales and 
productivity. Fourth and lastly, an interesting topic should be looking at the number of 
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7 | Figures 
 Figure 1| Geographical location of gazelle and non-gazelle start-ups 
   <10 
 
 10– 20 
 
20 – 30 
  
30 >  







      
 
Economic Activity 
 Construction (ISIC 45) 
 Manufacturing (ISIC 15 - 37) 
 Services (ISIC 50 -74) 






 5 – 10 
  
> 10 
Figure 2| Economic sectors for gazelle and non-gazelle firms. 
% of start-ups 
Gazelle Entrepreneurs 
34 










































Nº of employees between year 0 and 10





 Construction (ISIC 45) 
 Manufacturing (ISIC 15 - 37) 
 Services (ISIC 50 -74) 






 5 – 10 
  
> 10 
% of start-ups 






8 | Tables 
Table 1| Previous studies on gazelle entrepreneurs 
This table summarizes the academic findings regarding the gazelle entrepreneurs. 









The impact on employment five 
years from now of new firms, 
rapidly growing firms and plants 
that entered today. 
Gazelles are seen as 
new rapid growing 
firms. Small firms that 
did not grow are 
called “Mice”, and the 
big firms with a large 
employment share, 
but generating little 
new employment, 
“Elephants” 
Sector: Private sector, although 
they are presented in all 
industries. 
Size: Most new firms are small 
Region: Most gazelles regions 
are near the universities and 
research facilities, in large cities 
Age: Younger on average 
Positive short-term employment effects, 
negative employment effects two years 
after entrance and pronounced long term 
effects. Star-ups with greater than 20 
employees and less than 500 have 
persistent employment effects over time 





Definitions of HGFs in terms of 
value added and productivity, and 
analyze how much the different 
types of HGFs contribute to 
employment growth, economic 
growth, productivity growth and 
sales growth. 
Birch’s definition 
Conclude that firm age, rather 
than firm size, determines rapid 
growth and, hence, that firm 
age is crucial for net 
employment growth. 
Age: Younger on average 
Give a large positive contribution to 






What is the real contribution of 
small firms to economic growth 
and employment generation? Are 
high-growth firms more common 
in high-technology sectors? 
Increases sales by at 












Table 1| Previous studies on gazelle entrepreneurs (Cont.) 
This table summarizes the academic findings regarding the gazelle entrepreneurs. 
Authors Research 
Questions 
Gazelle Definition Determinants of Gazelle’s 
Growth 





Bos & Erisk 
Stam, (2011). 
 
In what extent the 
gazelles are the drivers 
of the growth of 
industries and structural 
change? 
Young, high growth firm. 
Innovative industries 
(Eckhard and Shane,2011); A 
firm with 5 to 10 years old 
with at least 20 employees 
Sector: All industries. 
Size: An increase in the presence of 
gazelles in an industry has a positive 
effect on the subsequent growth of the 
industry. 
Age: Younger on average 
Gazelles are early movers 
concerning the recognition and 
realization of industry opportunities 
and they seems to be important 







In a population of firms, 
net employment growth 
is generated by a small nº 
of gazelles; On average, 
gazelles are younger 
than other firms; On 
average, gazelles are 




“A business establishment 
which has achieved a 
minimum of 20% sales 
growth each year over the 
interval, starting from a base-
tear revenue of at least 
$100,000” 
OECD proposed defining 
gazelles as a high-growth 
enterprise with an average 
employment growth rate 
exceeding 20% p.a over a 3-
year period and with ten or 
more employees at the 
beginning of the period. 
Sector: All industries; 
Overrepresented in services. 
Size: Gazelles can be of all sizes but 
small firms are overrepresented 
Age: Younger on average 
A small number of high-growth 






Table 1| Previous studies on gazelle entrepreneurs (Cont.) 
This table summarizes the academic findings regarding the gazelle entrepreneurs. 
Authors Research 
Questions 
Gazelle Definition Determinants of Gazelle’s 
Growth 







Propose an integrative 
and explanatory model 
of the gazelles. 
Companies that are capable 
experiencing a high rate of 
growth in a very short time. 
 
Size: Most gazelles companies are 
SMEs. They experience a strong 
growth in their size that in most cases, 
they may duplicate their dimension in 
a short period of time. 
Age: Younger on average 
Generate a great number of 
new jobs. In the USA, these 
high-growth enterprises are 
responsible for approximately 
70% approximately of the 
growth of the employment 
rate in the recent years 
 
Senderovitz 
et al., (2012). 
Relationship between 
growth and subsequent 
profitability for gazelle 
firms, and how this is 
moderated by firm 
strategy. 
Small firms growing 
considerably faster than the 
average industry level. 
Sector: All industries 
Region:  represented in all regions, 
although the majority seem to be 
centered around the capital   
Gazelle firms have a large 
impact on job creation and 
economic development. 








How initial growth rates 
might help to explain 
performance differences 
among surviving firms. 
Gazelles are defined as a 
subset of the high-growth 
firms, excluding firms older 
than five years. 
- Gazelles are often outperformed by slower growing 
entrants in the long run. The higher initial growth has 
persistent negative effects on firms’ long run 
performance, including lower employment growth, 
higher employee turnover, and most importantly lower 
survival rates. In sum, reaching a larger size through 
continuous moderate growth is better than reaching this 





Table 2 | Description of the variables 
Variables Description 
Panel A –Firms characteristics 
Initial Size 
The Initial Size is the logarithm of the initial number of employees in 
the start-up. 
Size t 
The Size t is the logarithm of the number of employees of a start-up in 
year t (t=4, ... ,10).  For example, Size4 is the logarithm of the number 
of employees of a start-up in 4th year of activity. 
Survival 
Dummy variable equalling one if the start-up is still running after seven 
years and zero otherwise. 
Panel B - Founders characteristics 
Age The age at which the entrepreneurs established the start-up. 
Gender Dummy variable, equalling 1 for men; and 0 for women. 
Education level 
Founder education at the time of establishing the start-up. With this 
variable we construct four dummy variables: 
High education is a dummy variable corresponding to 1 for 
founders with bachelors, masters or doctoral degrees; 
Medium education is a dummy variable corresponding to 1 
for individuals that attended high school or vocational school degree; 
Low education is a dummy variable corresponding to 1 for 
individuals that attended junior high school; 
Very low education is a dummy variable corresponding to 1 
for individuals that never attended or completed the elementary school; 
and 0 otherwise. 
Experience 
Founder industry or regional experience at the time of establishing the 
gazelle firm. We construct two dummy variables: 
Industry experience equalling 1 for founders that previously 
worked on the same industry and 0 otherwise. 
Regional experience which corresponds to 1 if the founders 
have previously worked in the same municipality; and 0 otherwise. 
Foreign Dummy variable, which equals 1 for foreign and 0 for Portuguese. 
One founder 
Dummy variable, equalling 1 for ventures established by one founder 




Table 3 | Descriptive statistics 
Panel A - Firms Characteristics 
          
 All Firms Gazelle Firms Non-Gazelle Firms 
 Obs. Mean S.D8. Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D. 
Initial Size 37,875 3.84 4.70 175 16.28 11.43 37,700 3.78 4.57 
Size 4 37,875 4.01 16.71 175 63.55 183.54 37,700 3.74 10.41 
Size 5 37,875 3.79 20.33 175 66.44 234.78 37,700 3.50 11.94 
Size 6 37,875 3.54 15.41 175 54.28 171.11 37,700 3.30 9.56 
Size 7 37,875 3.28 25.76 175 73.32 358.24 37,700 2.96 7.16 
Size 10 37,875 1.63 29.64 175 64.95 427.79 37,700 1.34 4.39 
Duration (Years) 37,875 6.20 3.56 175 7.59 2.45 37,700 6.20 3.56 
          
 Freq. %  Freq. %  Freq. %  
Industry9 37,875 100.00  175 100.00  37,700 100.00  
Construction 9,746 25.73  98 56.00  9,648 25.59  
Manufacturing 4,294 11.34  29 16.57  4,265 11.31  
Services 20,595 54.38  1 26.86  20,548 54.50  
Other services 3,240 8.55  47 0.57  3,239 8.59  
 Freq. %  Freq. %  Freq. %  
Region10 37,875 100.00  175 100.00  37,700 100.00  
Norte 14,236 37.59  89 50.86  14,147 37.53  
Centro 10,286 27.16  28 16.00  10,258 27.21  
Lisboa 8,336 22.01  41 23.43  8,295 22.00  
Alentejo 2,478 6.54  7 4.00  2,471 6.55  




                                                 
8 S.D. in the table means standard deviation (%). 
9 Following CAE.Rev2.1, we categorized into 4 industrial groups: Manufacturing, Services, Construction and 
other services. 
10 Following NUTS II division. the country is divided in seven regions, where five of them are in the mainland 
Portugal, and the remaining two are the autonomous regions (Azores and Madeira). We exclude the autonomous 
regions because of their insignificance.   
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Table 3 | Descriptive statistics (Cont.) 
 
Panel B - Founders Characteristics 
          
 All Firms Gazelle Firms Non-Gazelle Firms 
 Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D. 
Gender (Men) 37,875 0.69 0.46 175 0.77 0.42 37,700 0.69 0.46 
Age 37,875 37.0 10.40 175 34.0 8.51 37,700 37.0 10.41 
 Obs. % S.D. Obs. % S.D. Obs. % S.D. 
          
Education 37,875 100.00 0.99 175 100.00 0.93 37,700 100.00 0.99 
Very Low Educ. 8,228 0.22 0.41 36 0.21 0.41 8,192 0.22 0.41 
Low Educ. 15,087 0.40 0.49 87 0.50 0.50 15,000 0.40 0.49 
Medium Educ. 8,388 0.22 0.42 28 0.16 0.37 8,360 0.22 0.42 
High Educ. 6,172 0.16 0.37 24 0.14 0.34 6,148 0.16 0.37 
 
Experience 
         
Region Exp. 37,875 0.27 0.49 175 0.37 0.48 37,700 0.27 0.45 
Industry Exp. 37,875 0.18 0.49 175 0.34 0.48 37,700 0.18 0.38 
Foreign 37,875 0.04 0.17 175 0.09 0.29 37,700 0.04 0.19 
One Founder 37,875 0.42 0.50 175 0.31 0.46 37,700 0.42 0.49 
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for start-ups established between 2000 and 





Table 4 | OLS model for start-ups initial size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables 
 
Size 4 Size 5 Size 6 Size 7 Size 8 Size 9 Size 10 
Gazelle 1.440*** 1.300*** 0.86*** 0.686*** 0.523*** 0.369*** 0.193* 
 (20.01) (12.42) (7.84) (4.98) (3.91) (2.95) (1.68) 
        
Initial Size 0.601*** 0.538*** 0.492*** 0.436*** 0.340*** 0.269*** 0.194*** 
 (52.79) (44.06) (39.19) (34.65) (29.16) (25.22) (20.46) 
        
Age 0.0268*** 0.0297*** 0.0297*** 0.0301*** 0.0230*** 0.0190*** 0.0157*** 
 (9.46) (9.91) (9.63) (9.73) (7.96) (7.12) (6.61) 
        
Age2 -0.0316*** -0.0351*** -0.0354*** -0.0361*** -0.0280*** -0.0235*** -0.0195*** 
 (-9.11) (-9.56) (-9.37) (-9.49) (-7.84) (-7.11) (-6.57) 
        
Gender 0.0500*** 0.0522*** 0.0499*** 0.0430*** 0.0313*** 0.0187** 0.0207*** 
 (5.45) (5.35) (4.96) (4.22) (3.30) (2.18) (2.73) 
        
Low 
Education 
-0.00120 -0.00342 -0.0144 -0.0262** -0.0111 -0.00204 0.00527 
 (-0.10) (-0.28) (-1.13) (-2.02) (-0.90) (-0.17) (0.49) 
Medium 
Education 
0.0100 -0.0112 -0.0238 -0.0451*** -0.0297** -0.00989 -0.00642 
 (0.70) (-0.74) (-1.52) (-2.85) (-2.01) (-0.72) (-0.53) 
        
High 
Education 
0.122*** 0.121*** 0.103*** 0.0813*** 0.0565*** 0.0521*** 0.0332** 
 (7.12) (6.62) (5.42) (4.25) (3.23) (3.33) (2.43) 
        
Foreign -0.161*** -0.207*** -0.216*** -0.225*** -0.172*** -0.140*** -0.0918*** 
 (-6.31) (-7.92) (-8.34) (-9.03) (-8.16) (-7.82) (-6.48) 
        
Region 
Experience 
0.0210* 0.0181 0.0203* 0.0309** 0.0201* 0.0190** 0.0162* 
 (1.95) (1.58) (1.71) (2.57) (1.85) (1.97) (1.92) 
        
Industry 
Experience 
0.0723*** 0.0828*** 0.0830*** 0.0871*** 0.0595*** 0.0402*** 0.0160 
 (5.47) (5.88) (5.69) (5.90) (4.47) (3.42) (1.58) 
        
Founder -0.174*** -0.174*** -0.174*** -0.173*** -0.144*** -0.114*** -0.0861*** 
 (-19.43) (-18.45) (-17.99) (-17.86) (-16.30) (-14.25) (-12.11) 
N 37875 37875 37875 37875 37875 37875 37875 
Note: The table presents the coefficients of equation (1) using OLS. The dependent variable is the logarithm 
of the yearly number of employees of a start-up after the first three years until the exit year or until the exit 
year 2012. The independent variables are presented Table 2. Year, region and industry fixed effects (two-digit 
level) are included but not reported. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. Standard 
errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Norte Centro Lisboa Alentejo Algarve 
Gazelle 1.336*** 1.417*** 1.818*** 1.394*** 1.106*** 
 (13.39) (13.62) (9.11) (7.61) (14.25) 
      
Initial Size 0.610*** 0.655*** 0.524*** 0.608*** 0.584*** 
 (33.21) (31.89) (20.27) (15.09) (12.87) 
      
Age 0.0264*** 0.0317*** 0.0274*** 0.0300*** 0.00157 
 (5.57) (6.38) (4.08) (2.87) (0.14) 
      
Age2 -0.0307*** -0.0379*** -0.0320*** -0.0367*** -0.00429 
 (-5.20) (-6.30) (-3.91) (-2.88) (-0.33) 
      
Gender 0.0524*** 0.0451*** 0.0671*** 0.00679 0.0615* 
 (3.34) (2.79) (3.39) (0.19) (1.71) 
      
Low 
Education 
0.0250 -0.0216 -0.00497 0.00954 -0.0829* 
 (1.30) (-1.11) (-0.18) (0.22) (-1.73) 
Medium 
Education 
0.0366 -0.0296 0.0314 -0.0276 -0.0110 
 (1.47) (-1.16) (0.99) (-0.52) (-0.20) 
      
High 
Education 
0.140*** 0.0856*** 0.153*** 0.0704 0.105 
 (4.70) (2.70) (4.29) (1.09) (1.51) 
      
Foreign -0.152*** -0.135** -0.193*** -0.218** -0.0886 
 (-2.62) (-2.04) (-4.54) (-2.30) (-1.60) 
      
Region 
Experience 
-0.00863 0.0235 0.0843*** 0.00185 -0.00891 
 (-0.49) (1.20) (3.47) (0.04) (-0.21) 
      
Industry 
Experience 
0.0911*** 0.0602** 0.0713** 0.0759 0.0149 
 (4.21) (2.51) (2.44) (1.36) (0.29) 
      
Founder -0.183*** -0.163*** -0.145*** -0.215*** -0.190*** 
 (-12.12) (-10.12) (-7.39) (-6.33) (-5.34) 









Norte Centro Lisboa Alentejo Algarve 
Gazelle 0.209 0.235 0.464 -0.238** -0.562*** 
 (1.46) (0.86) (1.44) (-2.29) (-5.47) 
      
Initial Size 0.215*** 0.225*** 0.126*** 0.173*** 0.197*** 
 (13.56) (12.30) (6.90) (5.17) (5.65) 
      
Age 0.0242*** 0.0192*** -0.00223 0.0268*** 0.0134 
 (5.96) (4.23) (-0.47) (3.09) (1.50) 
      
Age2 -0.0317*** -0.0230*** 0.00355 -0.0362*** -0.0139 
 (-6.21) (-4.08) (0.59) (-3.30) (-1.29) 
      
Gender 0.0169 0.0216 0.0267* 0.0288 0.0366 
 (1.25) (1.48) (1.90) (1.05) (1.29) 
      
Low 
Education 
0.0252 0.00163 -0.00585 -0.0721* -0.0339 
 (1.37) (0.08) (-0.26) (-1.82) (-0.81) 
Medium 
Education 
0.00135 0.0251 -0.0170 -0.105** -0.0648 
 (0.06) (1.06) (-0.72) (-2.45) (-1.39) 
      
High 
Education 
0.0610** 0.0408 0.0280 -0.110** -0.0290 
 (2.53) (1.50) (1.07) (-2.42) (-0.52) 
      
 -0.0906*** -0.104*** -0.0898*** 0.0254 -0.0867*** 
Foreign (-2.91) (-2.61) (-3.87) (0.47) (-2.94) 
      
 0.0125 0.00364 0.0351** -0.0175 0.0627* 
Region 
Experience 
(0.85) (0.22) (2.16) (-0.58) (1.95) 
      
Industry 
Experience 
-0.00467 0.0446** 0.00460 0.0970** -0.0235 
 (-0.27) (2.28) (0.25) (2.36) (-0.63) 
      
Founder -0.0881*** -0.0820*** -0.0647*** -0.0773*** -0.121*** 
 (-7.02) (-5.88) (-4.99) (-2.94) (-4.70) 




















Gazelle 0.0214 . . 0.377* 














- - - 
-0.130 
(-1.61) 
Age 0.0185*** -0.0421 0.0186*** 0.0185*** 
 (10.84) (-1.55) (10.87) (10.84) 
     
Age2 -0.0204*** 0.0608 -0.0206*** -0.0204*** 
 (-9.60) (1.63) (-9.63) (-9.60) 
     
Gender 0.0242*** -0.0320 0.0247*** 0.0242*** 
 (4.33) (-0.28) (4.42) (4.33) 
     
Low Education -0.0210*** 0.0551 -0.0213*** -0.0210*** 
 (-2.98) (0.57) (-3.02) (-2.98) 
     
Medium Education -0.0438*** 0.125 -0.0439*** -0.0437*** 
 (-5.08) (1.00) (-5.08) (-5.07) 
     
High Education 0.0233** 0.00227 0.0231** 0.0232** 
 (2.32) (0.02) (2.30) (2.31) 
     
Foreign -0.143*** -0.240* -0.141*** -0.143*** 
 (-10.17) (-1.93) (-9.97) (-10.17) 
     
Region Experience 0.0191*** 0.0859 0.0187*** 0.0190*** 
 (3.03) (0.80) (2.95) (3.02) 
     
Industry Experience 0.0391*** 0.0566 0.0396*** 0.0391*** 
 (5.28) (0.55) (5.33) (5.27) 
     
Founder -0.0941*** -0.0913 -0.0938*** -0.0940*** 
 (-18.55) (-0.95) (-18.45) (-18.53) 
N 37868 140 37693 37868 
Note: The table presents the estimated marginal effects for the logit model using equation 
(2) and column (4) shows an interaction variable– size*gazelle. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable equalling one if the start-up is still running after seven years and zero 
otherwise. Year, region and industry fixed effects (two-digit level) are included but not 
reported. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. Standard errors in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Norte Centro Lisboa Alentejo Algarve 
Gazelle 0.00608 -0.100 0.0782 . 0.116 
 (0.12) (-1.05) (1.05) . (0.72) 
      
Initial Size 0.0813*** 0.0972*** 0.0307*** 0.0919*** 0.113*** 
 (9.83) (9.04) (2.84) (4.39) (5.63) 
      
Age 0.0219*** 0.0207*** 0.0144*** 0.0182*** 0.00353 
 (7.83) (6.46) (3.73) (2.71) (0.55) 
      
Age2 -0.0238*** -0.0233*** -0.0162*** -0.0202** -0.00287 
 (-6.74) (-5.86) (-3.40) (-2.44) (-0.37) 
      
Gender 0.0330*** 0.0206* 0.0184 0.0145 0.0306 
 (3.55) (1.94) (1.57) (0.66) (1.46) 
      
Low Education 0.000365 -0.0322** -0.0313* -0.0400 -0.0500* 
 (0.03) (-2.44) (-1.94) (-1.50) (-1.88) 
      
Medium Education -0.0133 -0.0668*** -0.0526*** -0.0593* -0.0640** 
 (-0.91) (-4.10) (-2.91) (-1.79) (-2.07) 
      
High Education 0.0281 0.000349 0.0402** -0.0309 0.0355 
 (1.64) (0.02) (2.03) (-0.79) (0.92) 
      
Foreign -0.131*** -0.209*** -0.145*** -0.0558 -0.102*** 
 (-4.10) (-5.94) (-6.18) (-1.02) (-3.35) 
      
Region Experience 0.0120 0.0177 0.0361*** 0.0397 -0.000323 
 (1.16) (1.47) (2.70) (1.52) (-0.01) 
      
Industry Experience 0.0423*** 0.0526*** 0.0229 0.0429 0.0173 
 (3.54) (3.59) (1.47) (1.39) (0.62) 
      
Founder -0.0961*** -0.0949*** -0.0904*** -0.0887*** -0.0814*** 
 (-11.54) (-9.71) (-8.41) (-4.42) (-4.24) 
N 14229 10279 8330 2449 2524 
Note: The table presents the estimated marginal effects for the logit model using equation 
(2). The dependent variable is a dummy variable equalling one if the start-up is still running 
after seven years and zero otherwise. Year, region and industry fixed effects (two-digit level) 
are included but not reported. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Gazelle -0.117 . . 0.819 
 (0.111) . . (0.967) 
     
Initial Size -0.177*** -0.380 -0.174*** -0.176*** 
 (0.019) (0.521) (0.019) (0.020) 
     
Initial Size*Gazelle - - - -0.346 
    (0.361) 
     
Age -0.048*** -0.084 -0.047*** -0.048*** 
 (0.007) (0.152) (0.007) (0.007) 
     
Age2 0.054*** 0.150 0.054*** 0.054*** 
 (0.009) (0.230) (0.009) (0.009) 
     
Gender -0.127*** 0.251 -0.128*** -0.127*** 
 (0.021) (0.424) (0.021) (0.021) 
     
Low Education -0.019 0.691 -0.022 -0.019 
 (0.029) (0.501) (0.029) (0.029) 
     
Medium Education -0.028 0.586 -0.030 -0.028 
 (0.033) (0.608) (0.033) (0.033) 
     
High Education -0.233*** 0.975 -0.235*** -0.233*** 
 (0.038) (0.744) (0.038) (0.038) 
     
Foreign 0.347*** 2.317*** 0.339*** 0.347*** 
 (0.048) (0.534) (0.048) (0.048) 
     
Region Experience -0.151*** -0.118 -0.150*** -0.151*** 
 (0.019) (0.329) (0.019) (0.019) 
     
Industry Experience -0.168*** 0.251 -0.170*** -0.169*** 
 (0.020) (0.335) (0.020) (0.020) 
     
Founder -0.210*** 0.045 -0.211*** -0.210*** 
 (0.012) (0.157) (0.012) (0.012) 
N 114,811 833 113,978 114,811 
Note: The table presents the results of duration (in years) of the firms, according to the Cox 
Proportional Hazard Model and column (4) shows an interaction variable – size*gazelle. The 
table present the coefficients rather than hazard ratios.  Standard errors in parentheses *** 




Table 10 | Cox Proportional Hazard model for start-ups survival by region 
Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
Variables 
 
Norte Centro Lisboa Alentejo Algarve 
Gazelle -0.169 -0.084 -0.039 -44.355 -0.119 
 (0.164) (0.406) (0.158) (0.000) (0.358) 
      
Initial Size -0.127*** -0.280*** -0.154*** -0.312*** -0.260*** 
 (0.031) (0.047) (0.038) (0.088) (0.073) 
      
Age -0.063*** -0.070*** -0.031* -0.071** -0.009 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.030) (0.026) 
      
Age2 0.074*** 0.079*** 0.032 0.088** 0.010 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.038) (0.032) 
      
Gender -0.127*** -0.087* -0.171*** 0.024 -0.162** 
 (0.037) (0.046) (0.041) (0.092) (0.077) 
      
Low Education -0.036 0.033 -0.069 0.088 0.000 
 (0.048) (0.062) (0.061) (0.123) (0.104) 
      
Medium Education -0.066 0.063 -0.131** 0.084 -0.182 
 (0.057) (0.071) (0.065) (0.139) (0.115) 
      
High Education -0.217*** -0.231*** -0.328*** 0.039 -0.427*** 
 (0.066) (0.085) (0.076) (0.158) (0.138) 
      
Foreign 0.351*** 0.407*** 0.272*** 0.015 0.260** 
 (0.114) (0.113) (0.076) (0.236) (0.125) 
      
Region Experience -0.129*** -0.099** -0.179*** -0.121 -0.201*** 
 (0.034) (0.041) (0.037) (0.080) (0.069) 
      
Industry Experience -0.166*** -0.194*** -0.101** -0.167* -0.197*** 
 (0.034) (0.043) (0.040) (0.087) (0.073) 
      
Founder -0.239*** -0.240*** -0.150*** -0.279*** -0.145*** 
 (0.021) (0.026) (0.024) (0.056) (0.049) 
N 43,377 29,585 23,564 6,823 7,845 
Note: The table presents the results of duration (in years) of the firms, according to the Cox 
Proportional Hazard Model with an interaction variable – size*gazelle.  The table present the 
coefficients rather than hazard ratios.  Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 




9 | Appendix 
Table A. 1| Nº of employees during the period analysed for gazelle firms  
 
Region Initial Size Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5 Size 6 Size 7 Size 8 Size 9 Size 10 
Norte 1393 2320 3395 4273 3661 3530 3226 2635 1798 1218 736 
Lisboa 880 1958 2349 5675 6032 6818 5207 9171 10676 8357 10345 
Centro 368 632 811 947 1033 932 803 792 731 604 284 
Alentejo 82 135 190 220 210 166 136 130 98 59 2 
Algarve 126 205 231 282 186 181 127 103 11 0 0 
Total 2849 5250 6976 11397 11122 11627 9499 12831 13314 10238 11367 
 
 
Table A. 2| Nº of employees during the period analysed for non-gazelle firms 
  
Region Initial Size Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5 Size 6 Size 7 Size 8 Size 9 Size 10 
Norte 59774 65716 63842 60925 58366 54770 52446 47872 38144 30271 23038 
Lisboa 29196 32778 32205 30446 29196 26937 24135 20387 14940 10542 6921 
Centro 35812 39815 39223 37358 35304 33380 31761 29012 23866 19187 14586 
Alentejo 8676 9458 9401 9149 8652 8134 8112 6752 5560 4062 2693 
Algarve 9034 10227 10403 9727 9368 8626 8022 7490 6051 4247 3092 
Total 142492 157994 155074 147605 140886 131847 124476 111513 88561 68309 50330 
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Gazelle 0.0188 . . 
 (0.52) . . 
    
Initial Size 0.0765*** -0.288*** 0.0764*** 
 (14.74) (-2.62) (14.66) 
    
Age 0.0187*** -0.0353 0.0188*** 
 (10.85) (-1.50) (10.88) 
    
Age2 -0.0206*** 0.0507* -0.0207*** 
 (-9.62) (1.69) (-9.65) 
    
Gender 0.0242*** -0.000167 0.0247*** 
 (4.35) (-0.00) (4.43) 
    
Low Education -0.0215*** 0.0365 -0.0217*** 
 (-3.05) (0.32) (-3.08) 
    
Medium Education -0.0447*** 0.0682 -0.0448*** 
 (-5.17) (0.51) (-5.17) 
    
High Education 0.0228** 0.0687 0.0226** 
 (2.27) (0.46) (2.24) 
    
Foreign -0.140*** -0.273** -0.137*** 
 (-10.81) (-2.10) (-10.60) 
    
Region Experience 0.0191*** 0.0841 0.0188*** 
 (3.02) (0.90) (2.95) 
    
Industry Experience 0.0389*** 0.0620 0.0394*** 
 (5.22) (0.69) (5.26) 
    
Founder -0.0958*** -0.107 -0.0955*** 
 (-18.37) (-1.12) (-18.28) 
    
N 37875 175 37700 
Note: The table presents the estimated marginal effects of the linear probability model using 
equation (2). The dependent variable is a dummy variable equalling one if the start-up is still 
running after seven years and zero otherwise. Year, region and industry fixed effects (two-
digit level) are included but not reported. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in 
parentheses. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Gazelle 0.0210 . . 
 (0.56) . . 
Initial Size    
 0.0757*** -0.323*** 0.0755*** 
 (14.61) (-2.68) (14.54) 
Age    
 0.0185*** -0.0431* 0.0186*** 
 (10.81) (-1.69) (10.84) 
Age2    
 -0.0204*** 0.0622* -0.0206*** 
 (-9.56) (1.81) (-9.60) 
Gender    
 0.0242*** -0.0239 0.0247*** 
 (4.33) (-0.23) (4.41) 
Low Education    
 -0.0215*** 0.0582 -0.0218*** 
 (-3.05) (0.61) (-3.09) 
Medium Education    
 -0.0440*** 0.115 -0.0442*** 
 (-5.11) (0.91) (-5.12) 
High Education    
 0.0222** 0.00844 0.0220** 
 (2.21) (0.06) (2.19) 
Foreign    
 -0.141*** -0.244* -0.139*** 
 (-10.27) (-1.90) (-10.07) 
Region Experience    
 0.0191*** 0.0774 0.0187*** 
 (3.04) (0.84) (2.96) 
Industry Experience    
 0.0384*** 0.0599 0.0389*** 
 (5.20) (0.66) (5.24) 
Founder    
 -0.0943*** -0.0918 -0.0941*** 
 (-18.53) (-1.09) (-18.44) 
N 37868 140 37693 
Note: The table presents the estimated marginal effects of the probit model using equation 
(2). The dependent variable is a dummy variable equalling one if the start-up is still running 
after seven years and zero otherwise. Year, region and industry fixed effects (two-digit level) 
are included but not reported. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. 














Gazelle 0.0214 0.0188 0.0210 
 (0.57) (0.52) (0.56) 
Initial Size    
 0.0763*** 0.0765*** 0.0757*** 
 (14.62) (14.74) (14.61) 
Age    
 0.0185*** 0.0187*** 0.0185*** 
 (10.84) (10.85) (10.81) 
Age2    
 -0.0204*** -0.0206*** -0.0204*** 
 (-9.60) (-9.62) (-9.56) 
Gender    
 0.0242*** 0.0242*** 0.0242*** 
 (4.33) (4.35) (4.33) 
Low Education    
 -0.0210*** -0.0215*** -0.0215*** 
 (-2.98) (-3.05) (-3.05) 
Medium Education    
 -0.0438*** -0.0447*** -0.0440*** 
 (-5.08) (-5.17) (-5.11) 
High Education    
 0.0233** 0.0228** 0.0222** 
 (2.32) (2.27) (2.21) 
Foreign    
 -0.143*** -0.140*** -0.141*** 
 (-10.17) (-10.81) (-10.27) 
Region Experience    
 0.0191*** 0.0191*** 0.0191*** 
 (3.03) (3.02) (3.04) 
    
Industry Experience 0.0391*** 0.0389*** 0.0384*** 
 (5.28) (5.22) (5.20) 
    
Founder -0.0941*** -0.0958*** -0.0943*** 
 (-18.55) (-18.37) (-18.53) 
N 37868 37875 37868 
Note: The table presents the coefficients of equation (2) using Logit, linear probability and 
probit models. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equalling one if the start-up is 
still running after seven years and zero otherwise. Year, region and industry fixed effects 
(two-digit level) are included but not reported. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are 

























            
            
     
 
